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"You must resist the common urge toward the comfbrting narrative
of divine law, toward firy tales that imply some irrepressiblejustice.
The enslaved were not bricks in your road, and their
lives were not chapters in your redemptive history. They' were people
turned to fuel for the American machine. "'
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Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas. and West Virginia. 11c successfully argued
for the petitioner in Lewis i'. Lewis & Clark Marine, 531 U.S. 438 (2001). This article is dedicated
to the late Gerald Dunne whose influence led to the first draft of this paper over thirty-five years
ago. The author would like to thank Donald A. Dripps and Courtney Stirrat for their comments and
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Race has divided the United States from its inception.2 In 1973,
Professor Derrick Bell wrote "[t]he insidious destruction of the human
spirit is the essence of both slavery and the worst aspects of contemporary
white racism." 3 Recently, prominent writers blamed "racial tensions" for

the prolonged rioting in Ferguson, Missouri.' James Forman, Jr. argues

2. See U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 ("...three fifths of all other Persons.-): See, e.g.,
STxAUGHTON LYND. S/avert and the Founding Fathers, in BLACK IlISTORY 115, 129 (Melvin

Drimmer, ed. 1968) (quoting Thomas Jefferson: -[n]othing is more certainly written in the book of
fate, than these people are to be free: nor is it less certain that the two races, equally free, cannot
live in the same government.").
3.

Derrick A. Bell Jr., Racism in Amcrican Courts: Cause for Black Disroptionor Despair?,

61 CAL. L. Rrv. 165, 165 (1973). The notion that there are two sets of rules, one for white people
and another for black people, can be traced at least as far back as State v. Celia. A slave, where

Celia was hanged for beating her white owner. Robert Newsom. to death. Douglas 0. Linder. Celia,
A Slave. Trial (1855): An Account. FAMOLS TRIALS, http:/www.famous-trials.con/celia/180-

home [https://perma.cc/XJ5R-VFW5] (last visited Oct. 28. 2017).

The trial judge refused to

instruct the jury that Newsom's repeated rapes of Celia. beginning when she was fourteen years
old, could be a defense against the murder charges. I. The trial judge granted the defendant's

motion that it be allowed to appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, but the Missouri Supreme Court
ultimately refused to grant a stay of execution to facilitate the appeal. Id. Celia was hanged on
December 21, 1855, less than ten weeks after her trial. Id. Stays of execution in aid of appeal do
not appear to have been unusual, and denials of a stay of execution aftier affirmance of a capital
sentence appear to have been routine. But see State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128 (Mo. 1857). Jury
instruction no. 8 in Shou/tz, regarding a defendant charged with murder who claimed self-defense.

indicates Missouri did acknowledge self-defense as grounds for acquittal in the face of a murder
charge. presumably only for white defendants considering Celia's fate above:
The law of self-defense is emphatically the law of necessity. to wlich a party may have recourse
under certain circumstances to prevent any reasonably apprehended great personal injury which he
may have reasonable grounds to believe is about to fall upon him. If you believe that defendant had
reasonable cause to apprehend a design on the part of deceased to commit a felony upon defendant,
or to do huin some great personal injury, and that there was reasonable cause to apprehend immediate
danger of such design being carried out, and he shot and killed deceased to prevent the
accomplishment of such apprehended design, then the killing is justified upon the ground of selfdefense, and you should acquit.
I.

at 152 53. Compare Linder. supra note 3 (denying a stay of execution to facilitate an appeal).

antd State v. Ilouser 28 Mo. 233, 236 (Mo. 1859) (denying a stay of execution because the court
found no error in judgment). with State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 556 57 (Mo. 1878) (granting a stay
of execution for a murder charge), and/ State v. Byrne, 24 Mo. 151, 152 (Mo. 1856) (allowing stay
of executtion until judgment).
4.

See Matt Apuzzo, Ferguson Police Routinelv Violate Rights of Blacks, Justice Dept.

Finds, N.Y. TiMEiS (March 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/201 5/03/04/us/justice-department-

finds-patteri-of-police-bias-and-excessive-force-in-ferguson.htmi

[https://nyti.ms/2k50piy] ("The

[Department of Justice's Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department], based on a six-month
investigation. provides a glimpse into the roots of racial tensions that boiled over in Ferguson last

summer after a black teenager, Michael Browtn, was fatally shot by a white police officer, making
it a worldwide flash point in the debate over race and policing in America."): see also Larry
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"writers seeking to establish parallels between the Old Jim Crow and
mass incarceration overlook (or underemphasize) important aspects of
what made the Old Jim Crow so horrible." 5 In this context, Missouri's"
systematic destruction of the human spirit of African Americans through
its slave laws remains essential to understanding the genesis of the chasm
between the races that continues to this day.'
Buchanan, et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMEs, https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html'?
mcubz=l [https://nyti.ms/2jRJlil] (last updated Aug. 10, 2015) ("The protests against the police
have pitted the predominantly black community against a nearly all-white police force."). The
unrest led to legislative change in municipal funding and policing. See S. 5, 98th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Scss. (Mo. 2015) (proposing a bill requiring written and publicized minimum standards for
police use of force, annual auditing of municipal finances, alternative allocation of revenue from
traffic fines and court costs, and procedures and punishments for non-compliant municipalities);
see also Marshall Griffin, Missouri Legislature Sends Municipal Court Changes to the Governor,
ST. Louis PUBLIC RADIO, http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-legislature-sendsmunicipal-court-changes-govemor#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5C9V-2HDR] (last updated May 7,
2015, 6:14 PM) ("Missouri lawmakers have sent Gov. Jay Nixon the first bill of the 2015 legislative
session that deals with the fallout from last year's unrest in Ferguson."); Robert Patrick & Stephen
Deere, 'Sweeping'Court Reform Comes as Nixon Signs Bill to Cap Cities'Revenue, End Predatory
Habits, ST. LOUis POST-DISPATCH (Jul. 10, 2015), http://www.stitoday.comI/news/local/crimeand-courts/sweeping-court-refonn-comes-as-nixon-signs-bill-to-cap/article cafffb7e-b24d-5292b7bb-84etBlc6e81d.html [https://perma.cc/JSF6-GSYQ] ("Gov. Jay Nixon . .. signed a broad
municipal court reform bill that will cap court revenue and impose new requirements in an attempt
to end what the bill's sponsor called predatory practices aimed at the poor.").
5. James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass IncarcerationBeyond the New Jim Crow,
87 NYU L. REv. 101, 139 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.egi?article
=4599&context=fss papers.
6. The author acknowledges the invaluable background information of laws concerning
slavery on the Missouri Digital Heritage website. Laws ConcerningSlavery in Missouri: Territorial
to 1850s, Mo. DIGITAL HERITAGE, https://s l.sos.mo.gov/archives/education/aahi/earlyslavelaws/

slavelaws [https://perma.cc/8TZV-8CV6] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017, 9:36 PM).
7. This is neither an isolated nor recent phenomenon. Malcolm X referred to racism as
"plaguing America as an incurable cancer." See The Most Remarkable Revelatory Letter Ever
Written hv Molcom X, MOMENTS IN TIME http://momentsintime.com/the-most-remarkable-

revelatory-letter-ever-written-by-malcolm-x/#.WN6ZYDvvT2d
[https://perma.cc/6KNL-N3FR]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (reflecting on racism in America in light of his revelations about Islam).
Forty years later, James Ilart, a Republican, ran for the United States House of Representatives seat

for Tennessee's Eighth District "on a racist platform that explicitly supported eugenics . . . .- Lutz
Kaelbe,

Tennessee,

EUGENICS: COMPULSORY

STERILIZATION

IN

50 AMERICAN

STATES,

(last
[https://perma.cc/WW3U-PUSL]
https://www.uvm.edui/~-kaelber/eugenics/TN/TN.html
visited Oct. 30, 2017). James Hlart advocated for "a country populated by the 'favored races' of
Europe and Asia rather than 'unfavored races' of Africa." Id. "Hle believes that without the
elimination of welfare and 'unfavorable' immigration, the United States will become 'one big
Detroit,' a city with a high African American population." Id. "If an individual demonstrates the
ability to produce and contribute to society, he or she would be encouraged to have more children.
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BACKGROUND

Slavery predated the United States by millennia.' A brief discussion
of some of the features of servitude in Rome and England will place the
later discussion of Missouri's slave laws into context. While the ancient
Romans recognized slavery,' Roman slavery differed from the American
variant in significant respects. The Romans considered slavery to be a
creature of "the law of nations" and contrary to natural law. 'o Although

&

People on welfare would not." Id James Ilart was not elected in 2004. but he ran again as a writein candidate in 2006. Id. (exploring American eugenics by researching American states that
sterilized socially disadvantaged groups). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. PRINCIPLES 01 GOOD
POLICING: AVOIDING VIOlENCE BliTWlIEN POLICE AND CITIZENS (2003), https://www.justicC.
gov/archiveie/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfinal092003.pdf
[https://perma.ce/9SMW-EPEW]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2017). The Community Relations Service's [CRS] mandate requires the
provision of assistance to communities in conflict that would otherwise threaten peaceful race
relations. As a result, the CRS finds itself enmeshed in police-citizen disputes containing an
element of violence. The causes of such disputes are varied, but no cause "is more volatile than
allegations of unwarranted police use of deadly force against minority citizens." Id. Following the
1991 beating of Rodney King by a group of white Los Angeles Police officers that was videotaped
by a citizen, CRS's casework increased dramatically as communities and law enforcement agencies
began to examine their mutual interactions. I. Despite these efforts, African Americans continue
to be fatally shot by Caucasian police officers. Recent tragedies emphasizing this phenomenon
include the deaths of Trisha Miller in Riverside, California in 1998: Amadou Diallo in New York
City in 2000; and Timothy Thomas in Cincinnati in 2001. Id.
8. E.g., JUSTINIAN I. Ti IL INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 5 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford 1911) (535
C.E.).
9. See id at 5 ("In the law of persons, then, the first division is into free men and slaves.").
10. See id at 5 ("Slavery is an institution of the law of nations, agaiist nature subjecting one
man to the dominion ofanother."); Somerset v. Stewart. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.) ("The
state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or
political . . . " and can only be established by "positive law").
f CESARE BONEISANA
MARCIESI BECCARIA. OF CRIMES AND PUNISIHMENTS Ch. 20 (Philip II. Nicklin, 2d Am. ed.
1819), https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheoiy/beccaria/delitti/index.html [https://perma.cc/89Z6I133C] ("Liberty is at an end whenever the laws permit that, in certain cases, a man may cease to
be a person, and become a thing."). This view was echoed by Chief Justice Marshall.
The question, wheither the slave trade is prohibited by the law of nations has been seriously
propounded, and both the afttiriative and negative of the proposition have been maintained with
equal earnestness. That it is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied. That every nan
has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is generally admitted: and that no other person can
rightfully deprive him of those fruits. and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the
necessary result of this admission.

But from the earliest timacs war has existed, and war confers

rights in which all have acquiesced. Among the most enlightened nations of antiquity, one of these
was, that the victor might enslave the vanquished. This. which was the usage of all, Could not be
pronounced repugnant to the law of nations, which is certainly to be tried by the test of ncural usage.
That which has received the assent of all. must be the law of all. Slavery. then, has its origin in force:

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol20/iss1/3
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slavery was inheritable, Justinian Institutes held that a child born of a
woman who was free at the moment of childbirth was also free, even if
the father was a slave and even if the woman was a slave at the time of
conception.'' Manumission was freely, even casually, granted:12 "It is
usual for slaves to be manumitted by their masters at any time, even when
the magistrate is merely passing by, as for instance while the practor or
proconsul or governor of a province is going to the baths or the theatre."
Perhaps the most important distinction between Roman slavery and that
which was prevalent in the antebellum United States, as well as other
cultures, 4 was that the race of the slave mattered little, if at all, to the
Romans.'
"If the Roman law of slavery had any force at all [to the
but as the world has agreed that it is a legitimate result of force, the state of things which is thus
produced by general consent, cannot be pronounced unlawful.

The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 120 21 (1825). See also Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 561-62, 568 (1851)
(holding the common law did notjudge the killing ofa slave to be a felony by drawing a distinction
between a "villeins" [sic] essentially serfs and "negro slavery."). Shortly before the outbreak
of the American Civil War, one author argued natural law compelled the enslavement of black
Americans.

See Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER

WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 75 6, 97 (1999) [hereinafter Finkelman, R.R. Cobb] (reporting on proslavery

efforts in the 19th century to reconcile American law, slavery, and "the natural order of things").
11.

See JUSTINIAN Isupra note 8, at 5 (explaining the theories of"freebom" men).

12.

Justinian's account of manumission and its effect on society is instructive.

Those are freedmen, or made free, who have been manumitted from legal slavery. Manumission is
the giving of freedom: for while a man is in slavery he is subject to the power once known as manus;
and from that power he is set free by manumission. All this originated in the law of nations; for by
natural law all men were born free-slavery, and by consequence manumission, being unknown.
But afterwards slavery came in by the law of nations, and was followed by the boon of manumission;
so that though we are all known by the common name of 'man', three classes of men came into
existence with the law of nations, namely men free born, slaves, and thirdly freedmen who had
ceased to be slaves.

Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 6. Compare JUSTINIAN 1, supra note 8, at 6 (commenting on liberal granting of
manumission) with Rennick v. Chloe, 7 Mo. 197, 204 (1841) (dismissing the idea that a slave owner
had broad power to manumit because such a power could "be deemed a power to annihilate slavery,
by converting slaves into freemen").
14.

See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY & SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 58

(1982) (discussing the effect a slave's skin color had not only in the Americas, but also in Islamic
societies where black skin is still associated with slavery).
15, See W.W. BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE CONDITION OF THtE SLAVE
IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1908)

(footnotes omitted) ("Slavery has of course meant different things at different times and places. In
Rome . . . [a]ny citizen might conceivably become a slave: almost any slave might become a
citizen."); see also PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 58 ("Rome is fascinating in this regard. The slave
population blended easily into the larger proletariat, and the high rate of manumission meant that
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cighteenth-century Anglo-American lawyer], it was on the 'fundamental'
level of ultimate rationale, not on the transactional level calling for rules
of decision."'"
Robert M. Cover describes how the American colonial justification of
slavery evolved from the Roman rationale. 17 That is, from the promise
of the victor not to kill the vanquished in exchange for the latter's promise
to work, to the limited justification for slavery, as posited by Montesquie,
in certain climates where civilization could not flourish without forced
labor.' Montesquie's rationale limiting justification for slavery raises
another important question, asking how slaves ought to be treated in light
of this utilitarian need.'
Cover quotes Montesquieu's sarcastic
"justification" for slavery on the basis of racial characteristics: "It is
impossible to suppose these creatures to be men, because allowing them
to be men, a suspicion would follow that we ourselves are not
Christians."20
Common law deriving from the first century of English colonial
slavery had little reference to slavery. 2 ' Lord Chancellor Northington
ethnicity was useless as a means of identifying slaves."). This is not to say that the slave's origin
was unimportant; Romans painstakingly categorized slaves by notion, or place of origin. JUSTINIAN

1. Til DIGEST VOL. 11, 21.1.31.21 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds. trans., Univ. of Penn. Press 1985).
The Romans associated certain ethnicities with certain traits. See, e.g.. CICERO. LETTERS TO

ATTICUS VOL. I at 325 (T.E. Page & W. II. D. Rouse eds., E. 0. Winstedt trans., Loeb Classical
Library 1912) (observing Britons would not be learned in literature or music); MARTIAL. EPIGRAMS

I at 259 (Walter C. A. Ker trans. 1919) ("[W]hat kind of boy I would wish to ask for. First of all,
let this boy be born on the shores of the Nile: no country knows better how to beget roguish ways.").

16. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERYAND TILL JUDICIAL PROCESS II
(Yale Univ. 1975).
17. See id. at 14 (indicating that Montesquicu justified slavery on the basis of racial
characteristics).

18.
19.
20.

i.

I.
Id. at 14 (Yale Univ. 1975) (quoting Montesquieu, TIHE SPIRITOF LAW (U. of Cal. Press

1748)). Paul Finkelman posits that
[d]espite slavery's presence in most cultures and most cras. slavery in the Americas was
fundamcntally differet: and slavery in the United States was even more unique and peculiar. There
were two reasons for this: the racial nature of slavery in the Amcricas[;] and the presence of human
bondagc in a society predicated on political democracy. republican government[,] and fundamental
equality.
Finkelman, R.R. Cobb, supra note 10, at 76 77. Finkelman also explained Cobb's view of slavery
was not necessarily an evil, but part of preserving American freedom. Id. at 76.
21. Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave: The Foundationsof ColonialAmerican Slve Law,
5 YALI J.L. & HUMAN. 417,417 (1993): George Van Cleve. Somerset 's Case and Its Antecedents
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famously held that "[a]s soon as a man sets foot on English ground he is
free: a negro may maintain an action against his master for ill usage and
may have a Habeas Corpus if restrained of his liberty." 2 2
American jurists cited the English law as authority for slavery but
simultaneously rejected the essential attributes of English servitude. In
fact, Judge Nisbet traced the origins of American colonial slavery directly
to England:

in Imperial Perspective, 24 L. & lIST. REV. 601, 608 (2006) (finding little to no evidence,
statutorily or in the common law, showing the presence of chattel slavery in England between the
16th and 18th centuries); see MIRANDA KAUFMANN, AFRICANS IN BRITAIN:

1500 -1640 (Ph. D.

Dissertation, Oxford Univ. 2012) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and
Social ,Justice) ("[Nleither the English nor the Scottish legislatures ever issued a law code to

delineate the status of African slaves in contrast to the Portuguese (Ordinacies Manuelinas, 14811514). the Dutch Republic (East India Ordinances, 1622 onwards), France (Code Noir, 1685); and
Virginia in the 1670s."). But see A. Russell, 1606 Act of the Scottish Parliament Anent
Coalvers and Salters', HOOD FAMILY, http://www.hoodfamily.info/coal/lawl6O6act.htmi
[https://perma.cc/DSQ6-3B3J] (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (prohibiting anyone from hiring a collier
or salter unless first released by his master, effectively creating a permanent state of bondage).
Almost 170 years later, the 1775 Act of Parliament explicitly recognized the effect of the Scottish
statute was that "many Colliers, Coal-bearers, and Salters are in a state of slavery or bondage, bound
to the Collieries and Salt-works where they work for life, transferable with the Collieries and Saltworks, when their original masters have no further use for them . . . ." A. Russell, 1775 Act of
Parliament /br Altering, Explaining, and Amending Several Acts of Parliament of Scotland,
Respecting Colliers, Coal-bearers, and Salters, 11OOD FAMILY, http://www.hoodfamily.

info/coal/law I775act.html [https://perma.ec/BXK2-3W8Q] (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
22. Shanley v. 1Harvey. (1762) Eng. Rep. 844, 844 45 (K.B.); See Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga.
555, 568 (1851) (extending similar freedom and legal protection to any slave, regardless of his
country of origin, as soon as he or she sets foot upon British soil): see also KAUFMANN, supra note

21 (finding a lack of evidence "that Africans in Britain were any more slaves in practice than they
were in theory: they were not bought and sold, chained or collared; they were able to give evidence
in court and receive wages and baptism and marry; some were of independent means"). But see,
e.g., Travis Glasson, "Baptism Doth Not Bestow Freedom ": Missionary Anglicanism. Slavery, and

the Yorke-Talhot Opinion, 1701 30, 67 WM. & MARY Q. 279 (2010) (quoting P. Yorke and C.
Talbot. BOSTON GAZETTE, Sept. 7, 1730) The Yorke-Talbot opinion opened the door to slavery in
England, indicating that a slave, after traveling with or without his master
doth not become free, and that his Master's Property, or Right in him, is not thereby determined or
varied. And that Baptism doth not bestow Freedom on him, nor make any alternation in his temporal
Condition in these Kingdoms. We are also of Opinion, that his Master may legally compel him to
return again to the Plantations.

Id; see alsoThe Slave, Grace, (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 187 (High Ct. ofAdm.) (holding Shanlev
v. Harvey was not controlling precedent because "[t]he error of the opinion seems to be, that,

because the slave code was overruled in England. where the law of England differed from it, it was
therefore abrogated in the colonies in toto"). The Admiralty Court considered the law of England
to hold that anything given to the slave remained the slave's, and a slave may "have a habeas corpus
ifrestrained of his liberty." The Slave, Grace, (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 187 (ligh Ct. ofAdmi.).
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To any correct view of this subject, it is indispensable to distinguish
between Great Britain and her Colonies. As to the latter, we know that
slavery there did in fact, exist, and was sanctioned by usage under the Law
of Nations, and by Acts of Parliament; as to the former, we know that it
did not exist there, and received no such sanction. How could, then, the
Common Law attach upon the institution of slavery, in the Island of Great
Britain? The Laws of Nations would have justified slavery in England, had
it been there. But they did not create it there.
If there be guilt or impolicy in the slavery of the American States, it lies
at the door of Great Britain, now so fierce in her denunciations of it. She
was for years the patroness of the slave trade, and her cherished policy was
to stock her transatlantic plantations with negroes. If slavery be a curse,
which we do not concede, and which she asserts, it has been entailed upon
us by the avarice of British kings, councils and people. Her slave policy
ceased only, when she considered her Colonies well stocked. Her vaunted
humanity was perseveringly subordinate to her interests. I am convinced
that the zeal of Blackstone, and the eloquence of Wilberforce, would have
availed but little, had not Pitt and Fox, and the merchants of Liverpool and
Bristol, believed that the negroes of the Colonies, and their descendants,
were sufficient, and would continue sufficient, for all the wants of British
Colonial policy. 2 3
Judge Nisbet concluded England had manipulated the legality of
slavery in Georgia to suit its own interest. 2 4
The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged this principle of English
law, but narrowed its application.
23. Neal, 9 Ga. at 571, 574.
24. See Neal 9 Ga. at 575. Judge Nesbit's recounting of the history of slavery in Georgia
indicated the introduction of slaves in that state was unfavorable to England which was focused on
protecting the Carolinas to the north. Id The "mother country" felt the presence of slaves would
frustrate the intent of building up a strong settlement of white men to defend against the Spanish
territories to the south and the Indian tribes to the west. Id. Despite the prohibition, slave ownership
was common in the Carolinas: "Oglethorpe himself, was a slave-holder in Carolina, and so was Mr.
Wesley, one of the best and greatest men of that epoch. During that time, the banner of St. George
waved its protecting folds over half a million of slaves." Id. Nesbit concluded his summary by
declaring this history should "suffice to authenticate the fact, that slavery was recognized by law.
in the British Colonies." Id. The prohibition against slavery in Georgia was eliminated in 1751
under authority from the Crown. Id.
25. In one such case, Scott v. Emerson. the Supreme Court of Missouri explicitly cited
English common law in holding a slave could not sue for his freedom after being brought to a state
which prohibited slavery and subsequently returned to his master in a state where slavery was not
prohibited. Scott, A Man of Color, v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576. 585 86 (1852). This outcome
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MISSOURI SLAVE LAWS: OVERVIEW

American enslavement of Africans differed from enslavement of
others, including Native Americans.2 6 In Missouri, numerous laws not
only protected the institution of slavery of black Americans, but also
oppressed nominally "free" blacks. 2 7 Slavery was deeply rooted in
contrasted with the law of England, "where it is said her air is too pure for a slave to breathe in,
and that no sooner does he touch her soil than his shackles fall from him." Id. (emphasis added)
(citing The Slave, Grace, (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 184 (High Ct. of Adm.), 2 1lagg. 94, 109). In
the English case, The Slave, Grace,
[A] female attendant, by birth and servitude a domestic slave, accompanied her mistress to England,
resided there for a year. and then voluntarily returned with her mistress to the place of her birth and
servitude [Antigua], although, during the residence in England, no dominion, authority, or coercion,
could be exercised over such person, yet, on her return to her place of birth and servitude, the right
to exercise such dominion revives.
The Slave, Grace, (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 179 (1 ligh Ct. of Adm.), 2 Hagg. 94, 94. That decision
rejected the prior precedents as inapplicable and concluded that if slaves were freed by coming to
England. the "public inconvenience" would be great because they would be tempted to try to come
to England for freedom, making the venture "not only extremely burdensome to the colony, but,
..
highly dangerous to its peace and security." Id. at 186, 2 IHagg. at 115 16. But even the
Admiralty Court in Grace recognized that a slave had the right to sue for freedom under a writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at 187, 2 I lagg. at 117. The Missouri Supreme Court in Emerson also relied on
the Kentucky decision in Graham v. Strader when it did not allow Scott to sue for his freedom.
Emerson, at 586; Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5 B Mon.) 173, 181 (1844). That decision stated,
"[b]oth master and slave having gone from their own country . . . for a merely transient purpose,
and having, in accordance with their intention, returned without any visible change in their
relations, their relative condition under their own laws, will remain the same as if they had never
gone." Graham, 44 Ky. at 181. Graham also cited Judge Story's Commentaries on the ConJlict of
Laws stating, "it is very different question how far the original state of slavery might re-attach upon
the party, if lie should return to the country, by whose laws he was declared to be, and was held as
a slave." Grahcm, 44 Ky. at 182 83 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TIt CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 96A, at 148 50 (2d ed., The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2003) (1841). The Graham opinion
continued to rely on Story's commentary in resolving this question. Story in fact turned to the case
of The Slave Grace to answer the question, finding that "upon such a return of the slave to his
original domicil, the state of slavery would re-attach upon him." Grcham, 44 Ky. at 183.
26.

That as to the objection drawn from the superior injustice done the Africans, by the laws imposing
slavery on them, though lie would not undertake to justify them, yet he conceived them less unjust
than those now in question. For the Africans are absolute slaves in their own country, none but the
King being a freeman there. So that the act of Assembly only continued a slavery which existed
before, whereas, as to the Indians, the slavery is created by the acts.
Robin v. Ilardaway, I Jeff. 109, 122 (Va. 1772), 1772 WL 11, at *10.
27. See Clark v. I lenry's Adm'r, 9 Mo. 339, 346 (1845) (holding a slave-owner's will, which
allowed for a slave's freedom four years after his death, did not extend to the slave's child born
after the will's execution because a slave was a different character of other personal property and
the residuary clause could not "reach slaves, a species of property as distinctive in its character as
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Missouri law; 2 cntwined with it were the legal mechanisms for its
continued vitality and the concomitant oppression of an entire race. 2 9
Numerous laws applied to slaves and "free" blacks alike, but did not
impinge on the rights enjoyed by white citizens.
Such pervasive
restrictions on the freedom of "free" blacks inevitably lead to the
conclusion that free blacks were not second class citizens, but rather, first
class slaves.
III.

THE

Roo-'s

OF MISSOURI SLAVE LAWS: THE LOUISIANA TERRITORY

The Louisiana Territory's physical geography is at the root of Missouri
slave laws. 3 2 Although its upper territory, containing present-day
Missouri, was not as conducive to growing cotton as its lower territory,
crop potential in Louisiana was pretty evident, especially for hemp and
tobacco production, grain, and live-stock cultivation. 3 3 As a result,
Missouri become a breeding ground for slaveholders and their chattel.
When Louisiana was purchased in 1803, present-day Missouri had only

real estate."). But see Eaton v. Vaughn, 9 Mo. 743, 746 (1846) ("We do not feel ourselves at liberty
to make any discrimination between the property in our slaves, and any other chattels."). The
importuning of William Wilberforce in England had not yet taken significant hold in the American
slave states. See WILLIAM WILBERFORCE. A LETTER ON TIl AB3OLITION OF` T1E SLAVE TRADE:
ADDRESSED TO Till FREIIllOLDERS AND OTHER INHABITANTS 01 YORKSHIRE 1-2 (Cambridge

Univ. Press 2011) (1807) ("On the contrary. if the Slave Trade be indeed the foulest blot that ever
stained our National character. you will not deem your Representative to have been unworthily

employed, in having been among the foremost in wiping it away.").
28. While the first statutes on "Crimes and Misdemeanors" were passed in 1808, statutes
regulating free blacks were on the books as early as 1804. A DIGEST OF THE LAWS 01 THE

MISSOURI TERRITORY 136, 136 60 210-11, 309, 312 (Ilenry S. Geyer, ed.. St. Louis, Joseph
Charless 1818) [hereinafter DIGEST], https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35 112104852944.
29. See MO. CONST. of 1820, art. Il, § 26 (1945) (denying the Legislature the power to
emancipate slaves or to prevent slaveholders from other states to enter Missouri).
30. See, e.g.. DIGlST, supra note 28, at 312 (explaining how statutes regulated free blacks

more so than whites as black individuals could not touch white people and would be punished if
they did).
31. The Missouri Constitution urged the adoption of laws necessary to prevent the entry of
freed slaves into the state. See Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. Ill. § 26 (1945) ("It shall be their duty. as
soon as may be. to pass such laws as may be necessary. First, to prevent free negroes and mulattoes
from coming to. and settling in, this state. under any pretext whatsoever ....

32.

Lorenzo

J.

Greene et al., The Role of the Negro hi Missouri History (1719-1970).

OFFICIAL MANUAL OF TIil

ST. OF MO. (1973-1974), http://law.wustl.edu/staff/taylor/imanual/

slavery.htm [https://perma.cc/5LLT-LBS2] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
33. Id
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settled its castern and southern parts, but there were already 2,000-3,000
slaves within its territory."
Within five years of this tally, Congress, at Jefferson's urging, banned
the importation of slaves as part of the non-import movement against
Britain. "In his Summary View ofthe Rights of/British America (1774),

Thomas Jefferson asserted, somewhat disingenuously, 35 that Virginians
favored the 'abolition of domestic slavery' and as the first step toward
this end, 'it is necessary to exclude all further importations from
Africa."' 3 ' As a practical matter, importation of slaves into the United
States ceased during the Revolutionary War.3

34.

1lARRISON ANTIIONY TR:XLER.,SLAVIERY IN MISSOURI

1804 1865.at

9 (John Ilopkins

Univ. Press 1914).
35. "Disingenuously" because Jefferson, a slave-owner, wrote to Edward Coles, then
President Madison's assistant and later Governor of Illinois. stating:
[t]he idea ofenancipating the whole [race] at once, the old as well as the young, and retaining them
here. is of those only who have not the guide of either knowledge or experience of the subject: for
men probably of any color, but of this color we know. brought up from their infancy without
necessity for thought or forecast, are by their habits rendered as incapable as children of taking care
of themselves. and arc extinguished promptly wherever industry is necessary for raising the young.
In thc meantime they are pests in society by their idleness, and the depredations to which this leads
them.
E. B. WASt l3lURNE, SKETCt t OF EDWARD COLi.S SECOND GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, AND 01 TtHI
SLAVERY STRUGGlI 01 1823 24, at 26 27 (1882).

36. Paul Finkelman, The Abolition of the Slave Trade, N.Y. PUIt. LIR. (2007).
http://abolition.nypl.org/print/usconstitution
[https://perma.ce/T9JQ-XJQ6]
[hereinafter
Finkelman. Aholition]. David Brion Davis argues
Modern skeptics and critics of Jefferson forget that for some thirty-tive years. beginning in 1787,
the British abolitionist movement was governed by the similar assumption that abolishing the slave
trade would lead to the gradual and peaceful cmancipation of British colonial slaves. Critics also
forget that when Jefferson was president, he virtually commanded Congress to abolish the African
slave trade as soon as the Constitution permitted it to do so.
DAVID BRION DAVIS, TI IF PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN T ili AGl: oF RIVOLUTION 1770 1823, at 10

(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1975). Although Virginia purported to abolish slavery by The Act of
the Virginia Assembly of the 17th December, 1792. such abolition was merely illusory due to the
narrow interpretation and limited reading of the act by the Court. Scott v. Negro London, 7 U.S.

(3 Cranch) 324, 324, 329 (1806).
37.

Finkelman, .Aholition, supra note 36.

Dutritng the Revolution, all of the new states banned or suspended the international slave trade. Most
slaves arrived on English ships, and even those on American ships were purchased from agents of
the Royal African Company stationed on the west coast of Africa. Thus, all the colonies (which
soon became the states) banned the African slave trade as part of teir overall policy of refusing to
import anything from Britain. The 'non-important' [sic] movement was an attempt to cut all
economic ties with Britain. Since most slaves were brought in by British ships, and virtually all
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By 1860, the present limits of Missouri were inhabited by 114,931
slaves and 3,572 "free negroes." 8 The vast majority of this growth
occurred after the 1808 ban on slave importation. 9 It is worth noting
the price of slaves was not immune from commonly understood notions
of supply and demand: "Even though the slave trade grew, demand
exceeded supply and values rose. The price of slaves reached a peak in
Missouri during the period immediately preceding the Civil War. In
1860, top male slaves [were sold at] about $1,300 each and female slaves
[at] about $1,000. The State Auditor's report for 1860 placed the value
of the slaves in the State at $44,181,912."40

were purchased from the British on the coast of Africa, a ban on the trade was an important part of
the colonists' [sic I general policy not to trade with Britain-")
Finkelman observed altruism was, at this juncture, a secondary force in the abolitionist movement.
In some of the northern colonics, abolition of the slave trade had a moral as well as an economic
basis. Opposition to slavery was growing, and during or immediately after the Revolution, five
states would either end it outright (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) or pass gradual abolition
acts (Pennsylvania. Rhode Island, and Connecticut) that would lead to a relatively speedy end to
slavery. lit those states, a bait on the international slave trade was consistent with growing
opposition to slavery itself. In the remaining new states, where slavery was central to the economy.
opposition to the trade was economic and political, but not essentially moral. After the Revolution,
South Carolina reopened its international trade. but then suspended it in 1785 because ofthe ongoing
depression in the state. Similarly, North Carolina levied a prohibitive tax on newly imported slaves
and then in 1794 banned the trade altogether. The trade remained open in Georgia in 1787, but in
the wake of the Haitian Revolution, that state also banned it."
Id.

Further, slave owners may have been motivated by the necessity to use slaves in hot climates

where civilization depended on forced labor of men. COVER, supra note 16. at 14.
38.

TRIXLt:R.spra note 34, at 9 (1914).

39. See Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807) (prohibiting the
importation of slaves into the United States beginning January 1, 1808). In describing Thomas
Jefferson's efforts to stop the African slave trade in the American colonies, David Brion Davis
discussed the status of such importation practices:
We now know that one of the central differences between the Biritish Caribbean and North American
mainland colonies was that the slave population in the latter achieved a high positive growth rate.
in contrast to tle slave populations throughout the rest of the Hemisphere. This meant that AfricanAmerican slavery could flourish and expand in the new United States without continuing imports
from Africa. But in the 1770s. before the availability of national census data and when slave
population trends in the Lower Soutth were still very uncertain, it may well have been reasonable to
assume that ending slave imports would put human bondage itself on the road to what Lincoln later
tertmed 'ultimate extinction.
DAVIS, supra note 36, at 10 n.5.
40.

Greene et al.,supra note 32.
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Upon annexation, the area that would become Missouri was placed
under the governorship of the Territory of Indiana. 1 But citizens in the
present-day St. Louis area 4 2 feared the exercise of control by a free
territory could create a presumption against slavery and elected
representatives

to protest. 4

3

The

Indiana

territorial

government

responded by adopting a slave code for the Louisiana territory.4 4
The Louisiana Territory "Code Noir" 45 defined persons of color, but
did not define slaves:
Every person other than a negro, of whose grand fathers or grand mothers
any one is, or shall have a negro, altho' [sic] all his other progenitors,
except that descending from a negro, shall have been white persons, shall
be deemed a mulatto, and so every such person who shall have one fourth
part or more of negro blood shall in like manner be deemed a mulatto. 46
A statute deeming persons of color to be presumptively slaves was
unnecessary in antebellum Missouri. "In all slave-holding States, color
raises the presumption of slavery, and until the contrary is shown, a man
or woman of color is deemed to be a slave."
41. See Act Erecting Louisiana Into Two Territories, ch. 38, sec. 12, 2 Stat. 283, 287 (1804)
(indicating most of the land ceded by France became the territory of Orleans while the "residue"
was organized into the Indiana Territory and named the "district of Louisiana").
42. TREXLER, supra note 34, at 57 (explaining the "District of Louisiana" comprised the St.
Louis region and was subsequently placed under the government of the Indiana Territory).
43. Id. at 58 (citing '"Remonstrance and Petition of the Representatives elected by the
Freeman of the Territory of Louisiana," presented Jan. 4, 1805) ("[T]he petition requested 'that
Congress would acknowledge the principle of our being entitled in virtue to the treaty, to the free
possession of our slaves, and to the right of importing slaves into the District, under such restrictions
as to Congress in their wisdom appear necessary."').
44. Id. (fonnulating an "extensive slave code" advocating for a larger population of slaves
in the Missouri Territory).
Mo.

45. See Missouri State Archives: Missouri's Earv Slave Laws: A History in Documents,
DIG. HERITAGE, https://s I.sos.mo.gov/archives/education/aahi/carlyslavelaws/slavelaws

[https://perma.cc/8N2K-PQWR] (last visited Oct. 4, 2017) (discussing control of the slave
population from the mid seventeenth century through the turn of the nineteenth century when
French colonies "implemented the Code Noir, or 'Black Code,' attempting to define the parameters
of slavery in the area that later became the state of Missouri. It codified a way of life that separated
the burns and defined the circumstances under which the free community and slaves, black or
Indian, would co-exist.").
46. LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY, 1801 1809, at 40 (Francis S. Philbrick ed. 1930).
47. See Charlotte v. Chouteau, 21 MO. 590, 596-97 (1855) ("Although we have seen no law
or laws which, in terms, reduced the African race to bondage, yet it is an historical fact, as well
authenticated as any other, that the slavery of that race was recognized as legal in the Spanish,
French and British colonies in America."). But see Marguerite v. Chouteau, 3 Mo. 540, 571 (1834)
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MISSOURI STATE LAWS REGARDING SLAVES

Slaves were generally barred from trading in goods without the
permission of the slave's master. 4 8 "The statute was obviously designed
to prevent slaves from trading, selling[,] or dealing in any commodity
(that is, anything movable that is bought and sold) with a person, without
the master's permission or that of the owner or overseer." 4 " Judge
Ryland further concluded in Henke that hiring or transacting with a slave
for manual labor does not run afoul of the statute; instead the statute's
main purpose was to diminish a slave's temptation to steal by
constructively prohibiting the slave from buying or selling goods in
general, regardless of how they were acquired."o "A single transaction
may well be a dealing with a slave within the meaning of the act which
forbids such dealing."
Inheritability was a distinctive feature of American slavery.5 2
Frederick Douglas described a conversation with an Irish sailor who was
not at all surprised Douglas was indentured,5 but was shocked he was

(stating the same presumption of slavery did not apply to the descendants of Native American
slaves).
48. See State v. I lenke & I lenke, 19 Mo. 225, 226 (1853)
Any person who shall buy of. sell to or receiv e from any slave. any commodity whatsoever, without
the consent in writing of the master, owner or overseer of such slave first had and obtained, or who

shall deal with any slave without such consent. shall forfeit to the master. owner or overseer of such
slave. four times the valIte of the commodity so bought. sold or received, to be recovered by action
of debt with costs. and shall also forfeit to the county in wh ich the offense was committed. twenty
dollars, to be recovered by indictment.
Id. Indeed, the property of the slave was deemed in law to be the property of the master. Folden v.
Ilendrick. 25 Mo. 411, 414 (1857).
49. Henke & Ilcnkc, 19 Mo. at 227 (holding that the statute "does not include the manual
labor of the slave, however wrong it iay be to hire or to induce a slave to work or labor for a person
without the master or owner's knowledge and permission.').
50. Id
51. State v. Roilfing. 34 Mo. 348. 349 (1864)
52. Sec LAWRI:NCI: FRIEDMAN, A I IISTORY 01 AMERICAN LAw 2 19 220 (Touchstone 2d
ed. 1986) (explaining the early American legal system and its general economic and political
attitude toward property. slavery. government, crime, and justice).
53. FREDERICK DOULtASS. NARRA\TIVE tO: TII:H LIfi OF FREDERICK DoLt-ASs. AN
AMERICAN SLAvi: 60 1 (2012). In Texas, "Anglo colonists in some cases legally converted their
slaves into indentured servants for life in order to avoid Mexican laws" that abolished slavery.
ALWYN BARR, BLACK TOXANS: A HIISTORY Ot' AFRICAN AMERICANS IN TiXAS. 1528 1995 15
(2nd ed., Univ. of Ok. Press 1996).
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destined to be a "slave for life." 5 4 Missouri followed the American
pattern. In Lee v. Sprague, the plaintiff, "an infant of color," was born
during the period of his mother's enslavement.5 " Although the mother
was freed, the Court was unwilling to justify creating an exemption to the
long-standing Justinian rule that a person born of a slave was also a slave
himself." Moreover, his status as a slave did not terminate on the slaveowner's death; in Missouri, a slave owner could not legally manumit his
slaves by will:
The general policy of such States, in relation to this subject, is a matter of
history. Is it consistent with this policy, and the safety of the State, that in
States where slavery is tolerated, embracing a class of people of a different
race and different color from the citizens of those States, every slaveholder should be at liberty upon his own mere emotion to emancipate his
slaves, without the assent of the people of that State, expressed through
legislative enactments'? No such power could be presumed by a court,
consistent with the character of our political institutions.
Nor do I think any such power could be fairly inferred from an act
authorizing individuals to dispose of their chattels, admitting slaves to be
chattels, and they are so regarded for many purposes. A power to dispose
of chattels could not fairly be construed into a power to confer an important
political right upon a slave. That power could be only exercised by the
consent of the sovereignty. The master of the slave is not the only person
concerned in such a privilege as this; the whole community are alike
interested. If the Legislature authorized a citizen to dispose of all his lands
and tenements, it would hardly be contended that such an act would
authorize a man to bum down his house situated in the midst of a large
city, to the great damage and perhaps destruction of his neighbor's
property. No more could a power to dispose of slaves be deemed a power
to annihilate slavery, by converting slaves into freemen. 5 7

54. DOUGLASS,supra note 53, at 60-61.
55. See Lee v. Sprague, 14 Mo. 476, 477 (1851) (exploring the legal and property
ramifications of whether a child born to a slave is also considered to be a slave).
56. See id. at 477 (finding no reason to prevent "operation of a rule which so early and so
naturally glided into our jurisprudence from that of Justinian, and which but properly ordains and
establishes, at least in respect to the polity and policy ofthe institutions which recognize the relation
amongst us, that a person born of a slave is a slave.").
57. Rennick v. Chloe, A Person of Color, 7 Mo. 197, 203-04 (1841).
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The Missouri Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the holding

in Rennick:
Whilst, therefore, slaves are personal property, and may be transferred
under this general designation, it is worthy of observation that neither our
Legislatures, in enacting laws affecting this property, nor individual
owners, in declaring their intended disposition of it, either by deed or will,
have been apt to lose sight of the fact that they are also human beings, and
therefore the intention to affect this species of property, under the general
description of personalty, should appear manifest and plain before a court
could give such language so broad an interpretation.5
Because slaves were human property," the common law action of
trover would lie to recover the value of a slave who had been
misappropriated.'
Although the humanity of slaves 6 1 may have motivated the law
regarding property transfers, that concern did not extend to the

58. Clark v. I Henry's Adn'r, 9 Mo. 339,345 (1845).
59. Rennick, 7 Mo. at 203 (finding slaves tobe "a species of property sui generis, to be held,
disposed of, and regulated according to the laws of each particular State where slavery exists.")
60. Montany v. Rock, 10 Mo. 506, 508-9 (1847) (describing a plaintiffs action for trover
to recover a femalc slave sold in a sale for an amount less than what she was worth). This holding
appears to diverge from the English common law, where an action for trespass would likely be
more appropriate.
[a] decision that trover did not lie, for the reason that slaves were not articles of commerce. did not
therefore necessarily involve the conclusion that negroes could not be held in servitude in England
in the same manner as vilicins had been: and the claim might hav-e falued on/v beeause the proper

forim

ofremedy had not heen resortedto. Thus in Smith vs. GIoulId. though it was decided that trover

would not lie, as for articles of merchandise, yet 'the court seemed to think' that the plaintiff might
have sustained an action of trespass against the defendants for depriving him of a person held by
him as a captive, even if he had acquired his rights over such captive by purchase.
JOt IN CODMAN IlURD, Tit

LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN TIt UNITED STATES 187 (Negro
Univ. Press 1968) (1858) (emphasis added). There is some evidence that Africans possessed greater
rights than villeins; some Africans could and did marry. KAUFMANN, supra note 21. Even in the
U.S., courts noted in passing the human emotional turmoil resulting from the forced separation of
husband and wife. Folden v. I lendrick, 25 Mo. 41 1. 414 (Mo. 1857) ("The watch being the property
of the negro man, he gave it to his wife. What is more natural than that a man about to be separated
from his wife should be willing to give her a portion of the property he may have?).
61. The same year that the Missouri Supreme Court decided Rennick. the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized that slaves were human beings and made slavery illegal.

I cannot allow my mind to doubt of the plaintiffs 'inherent and indefeasible rights.' to become
'equally frce and independent' with other citizens, 'and of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing' his 'own
happiness,' except so far as he may, by the constitution and laws, be restricted or denied the right of
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punishment of slaves.1 2 For example, Joe, a slave, was sentenced to be
whipped after he was tried and convicted of larceny6 3 by a justice of the
peace." The justice courts were not conducted by trained lawyers, but
by local tradesmen and farmers." But the justices' lack of formal legal

suffrage, etc. All philanthropists unite in deprecating the evils of slavery, and it affords me sincere
pleasure, when my duty under the constitution and law requires me to break the fetters of the slave,
and declare the captive free.

Jarrot v. Jarrot. 2 Gilman 1. 8-9 (Ill. 1845).
62. See Forman, Jr., supra note 5, at 140 41 (describing public lynching and whipping
during interrogations as condonable acts pursuant to convictions under Jim Crow laws against
slaves).

Missouri laws provided far harsher punishment for slaves than for white people

committing the same crimes. See e.g., Slaves Act, ch. 206 (1831). 1824--1835 11 Mo. LAWS 277
(promulgating: a slave "shall receive on his, her or their bare back, any number of lashes not
exceeding thirty-nine. at the discretion and by the order of the justice of the peace, before whom
the trial is had"); Crimes and Punishment Act, ch. 93 (1829), 1824-1835 11 Mo. LAWS 146 ("Any
person who shall make an assault upon the body of any other person, with an intention, him or her
to kill, shall on conviction be imprisoned, not exceeding one year, stand in the pillory one hour, on
each of three several public days. in said year, and be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars.").
63. See State v. Joe, A Slave, 19 Mo. 223 (1853) (describing how a slave was convicted for
larceny and whipped pursuant to R.C. 1835, Article X1, §26 after he stole a fiddle and clothing
valued at S2.00); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 26 (1835)
If any slave shall commit petit larceny or be guilty of any misdemeanor or other offence [sic],
punishable, under the provisions of this act, only by fine, or by imprisonment in a county jail, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, he shall, instead of such punishment. be punished. if a male, by
stripes on his bare back. not exceeding thirty-ninc or, if a female, by imprisonment in a county jail
not execeding twenty-one days, or by stripes not exceeding twenty-one, at the discretion of the
justice.

See e.g. State v. Joiner. 19 Mo. 224, 224-25 (1853) (finding the white defendant guilty for
misdemeanor petit larceny after stealing one wool hat valued at S2.00); State v. Ramelsburg, 30
Mo. 26, 27 (1860) (finding theft from a dwelling amounts to grand larceny, even if stolen property
is valued ttnder S10.00, and is punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment).
64. See generally W. T. Waters, Atlanta's New Municipal Court, 78 CENT. L.J. 147, 150
(1914). Waters described an iniquitous system in which
[t]he justice courts were charged monotonously and wearisomely with accepting straw bonds: with
connivance between court officials and litigants; with using criminal machinery for the collection
of debts; with having people jailed at night without bond who might easily have been arrested in
daylight hours; with rough handling of prisoners; and with the issuance of garnishments against
persons whose wages were known to be exempt. In short, as the Fulton grand jury of the March
term, 1911. summarized it, they were charged with conduct which, 'terds toward anarchy and brings
into disrespect and disrepute the laws of the land!
65.

Chester I1. Smith, The .Jusiceofthe Peace Sstem in the United States, I5 CAL. L. REV.

118, 124 (1927) (footnotes omitted) Smith found the only necessary qualifications to be a justice
in Missouri included United States citizenship and residency in the state and city for at least 12
months preceding the election.
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training was not the only flaw plaguing the justice of the peace system.
Chester H. Smith identified three inherent problems with the office of
justice of the peace: first, the position was fee-based, so the justices' pay
derived from their judgments; 6 6 second, the justices were elected, and
therefore, had to stand for re-election; and third, decisions affecting the
justice's social status in the community inherently led to consideration of
personal interests, including the interests of those affected by an adverse
judgment.6
These features of the justice of the peace system tended to undennine
public confidence in their judgments."

When we have a highly technical and specialized body of law by means of which and through which
we demand that justice be administered, what confidence in our judicial organization can we hope
to develop when we clevate farmers, blacksmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, plumbers and every
conceivable kind of laborer and tradesman to the bench of a court ofjustice? It is as inconsistent to
assume that a layman can administer law correctly as it is to assume that a litigant should go to a
blacksmith to have his dental work done or to a farner to have a cost accounting problem in
manufacturing worked out.

Id. at 132.
66.

The Supreme Court later struck down a similar system in the Ohio "mayor's courts"

case. Ttumey v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ("That officers acting in a judicial or quasi judicial
capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided is of course the general
rule.").

67.

Smith, supra note 65, at 120 -21. In Missouri, in the case ofan acquittal in a capital case.

the costs were to be paid by the state and in other cases of acquittal by the county. An Act

Concerning Costs in Criminal Cases, § 3. 1843 MO. LAws 28, 29 (1843). Section 28 of the same
statute limited the justices' fees to one-half of the amount charged when the costs were payable by

the state or any county. Id. 28, 33.
68. Smith quotes S.F. Davis's description and opinion of the justice of the peace courts in
Mississippi:
Mr. S. F. Davis has vividly portrayed the attitude of such justices. He says that although the
constitutions and statutes fix the jurisdiction and territorial limitations of and prescribe rules of
procedure in the justice of the peace court as well as define its duties, 'All this is conveniently
ignored by some justices of the peace, who never allow themselves to be hampered, or their
jurtisdiction or court procedure restricted by any rules or regulations by the legislature or anybody
else.' 'They exercise original and unlimited jurisdiction over all such things as are given them by
the statutes, and they assume concurrent jurisdiction over everything else that they find loose in
their districts.' 'They all have and exercise the right to hold their courts at any place in their district.
but usually select a country store or postoffice [sic] as the place most suited for this business. They
generally like to have their trials well attended, and so hold their court where it is most likely to
draw the largest crowd, so that their judicial light will shine to the best advantage.' 'Though these
statements may seem hyperbolical to some, they will not so appear to those who have had actual
contact with the justice court. They do not exaggerate in the least some of the characteristics of the
system which have come under the observation of the writer. These characteristics bring this system
of courts into popular disrepute, and cause all manner of charges to be brought against it.'
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Although Missouri generally allowed appeals from justice of the peace
judgments to the circuit courts," it did not extend this right to slaves in
all circumstances. 7"

Arguing on behalf of appellant, Slave Joe, 7

1

Attorney Howell contended, "to hold that no appeal lies would be
monstrous. The constitution gives circuit courts a superintending control
over justices of the peace"72 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected that

contention out of hand, pronouncing the statute provided a summary
method for trying slaves accused of petit larceny; it did not provide an
avenue for appeal. Consequently, "there is no principle which would
warrant the circuit courts in entertaining jurisdiction in such cases." 7
"[A]ny negro or mulatto" convicted of rape-or attempt to rape was
punished by "castration, to be performed under the direction of the
sheriff, by some skillful person . . . . 7 Because this punishment was

Smith, supra note 65. at 124-25, (quoting S. F. Davis. Something about Some of the Justices' Courts

of Mississippi, 22 CASE & COM., 42 and 43 (1915)).
69. See, e.g., Dooly v. Jinnings, 6 Mo. 61 (1839) (granting review ofjudgment by Missouri
justices of the peace for a case involving purchase of an unsound horse).
70. State v. Joe, A Slave, 19 Mo. 223 (1853) (forbidding appeals before a justice of the
peace for slaves convicted of petit larceny).
71. "Slave Joe" was possibly a common name in the antebellum United States but the
identity of this particular Joe is intriguing. The lone American survivor of the Battle of the Alamo
was a black slave named Joe who disappeared from Texas in 1837. Ron Jackson, In The Alamo s
Shadow,

BLACK

HIST.,

https://www.tamu.edu/faculty/ccbn/dewitt/adp/history/1836/blacks/

jackson.html [https://perma.cc/7NNZ-BXRZ]

(last visited Oct. 28, 2017); see also RON J.

JACKSON, JR. & LEE SPENCER WHITE, JOE, TI I SLAVE WlO BECAME AN ALAMO LEGEND 7,240

41 (2015) (noting the famous "Slave Joe" was from Missouri, but was likely to be physically located
in Alabama at the time this case was tried, raising doubt that the tried "Slave Joe" was the "Slave
Joe").

72. Joe, A Slave, 19 Mo. at 223.
73. Id. at 223 24.
74. R.C. 1845, Art. 11, § 31, p. 349 (repealed 1865). Compare State v. Anderson, 19
241, 244, 246 (1853) (rejecting convicted slave's claim that sentence of castration
unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual" punishment), with R.C. 1845, ch. 47, art. II, §37, p.
(repealed 1865) (providing the punishment for white people convicted of similar offenses

Mo.
was
350
was

"imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or in a county jail not less than six

&

months, or by fine not less than five hundred dollars, or by both a fine not less than one hundred
dollars and imprisonment in a county jail not less than three months"), and Schwarz v. Hannibal
St. J.R. Co., 58 Mo. 207, 209 (1874) (requiring castration of a bull running at large be performed
"in a careful way, so as to do him as little damage as possible"). Note that section 31 required only
that the castration be performed by a "skillful person." R.C. 1845, Art. II, § 31, p. 349 (repealed
1865).
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neither death nor imprisonment in the penitentiary, the Missouri Supreme
Court determined the offense did not amount to a felony.
Missouri barred any "negro or mullato" from invoking the writ of
habeas corpus to obtain freedom.7
Although a person of color
wrongfully held in bondage had a statutory7 7 right to sue for freedom,
the law severely limited this right:
[Olur statute expressly throws the burden of establishing a right to freedom
upon the petitioner, and the provision is both wise and humane. Neither
sound policy nor enlightened philanthropy should encourage, in a
slaveholding State, the multiplication of a race whose condition could be
neither that of freemen nor of slaves, and whose existence and increase, in
this anomalous character, without promoting their individual comforts or
happiness, tend only to dissatisfy and corrupt those of their own race and
color remaining in a state of servitude. 7 8
The rationale for this holding was that "it has not been the policy of this
State, to favor the liberation of negroes from that condition in which the
laws and usages have placed the mass of their species.""7
The law erected another significant barrier to a person of color
attempting to establish that he was free: no black person could "be a
witness, except in pleas of the United States against negro or mulatto or
in civil pleas where negroes alone shall be parties.""o Jury duty was
75. Nathan, A Slave. v. State, 8 Mo. 631, 632 (1844) (taking a textualist approach to
statutory interpretation).
76. An Act ReCulating Proceedings on Writs of Haeas (opus , Mo. REv. STATS. Cii. 75
ART. II § 8 (1 845).
77.

DIGEST. supra note 28.

78. Charlotte (of Color) v. Chouteau, II Mo. 193, 200 (1847): An Act to Enable Person
Held in Slavery to Sue for Their Freedom, MO. REV. STATS. ('11. 69 § 12 (1845) ("if the plaintiff
be a negro or mulatto, he is required to prove his right to freedom").
79. Charlotte (of Color), 1 1 Mo. at 200. It was not uncommon for proponents of slavery to
view black Americans as a separate but sentient, and therefore human "species." See, e.g., REV.
H. N. McTYEIRE HT AL., DUTIES OF MASTERS TO SERVANTS: Ti REF PREMIUM ESSAYS 8 (1851)

(stating the duties owed by the master to the slave "are as binding as any the master may owe to
any other human creature").
80. LAws OF MISSOURI, LAWS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
107 (Statute Law Book Co. 1905) (1804), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35 112104853413. The
laws in colonial Virginia were particular on the matter:
And whereas negros. mulattos. and Indians. have lately been frequently allowed to give testimony
as lawful witncsses in the general court.... they are people of such base and corrupt natures. that
the credit of their testimony cannot be certainly depended upon, and some juries have altogether
rejected their evidence, and others have given full credit thereto: For prevening the mischiefs that
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reserved to "free male white persons of the age of twenty-one years.""
Thus, unless a free black person could produce a white witness to testify
on his behalf, he had slim chances of remaining free against a white
person's claim of ownership.1 2
Even indisputably free blacks faced enonnous legal challenges. "Free
Negroes, as a Virginia legislator said, had 'many legal rights but no
constitutional ones.' They had formal rights, in other words, but no real

may possibly happen by admitting such precarious evidence, . .
Be it further enacted, That no
negro, mulatto, or indian, either a slave or free, shall hereafter be admitted in ally court of this
colony, to be sworn as a witness, or give evidence in any cause whatsoever, except upon the trial of
a slave, for a capital offence: in which such case they shall be allowed to give evidence, in the
manner directed by one act of assembly, made in the ninth year of the reign of the late king George,
intituled, An Act directing the trial of Slaves committing Capital Crimes: and for the more effectual
punishing Conspiracies and Insurrections of them; and for the better government of Negros,
Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free.
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MAY 1732 5TH & 6TH GEORGE II 326 27, http://vagenweb.org/
hening/vol04-1 7.htm [https://perma.cc/8GXP-6RDL].
The latter statute provided swift and
barbaric punishment for black perjurers.
That where any such Negro, Mulatto, or Indian, shall upon due proof made, . . . be found to have
given a false testimony, every such offender shall, without further trial, be ordered by the said court
to have one car nailed to the pillory, and there to stand for the space of one hour, and then the said
car to be cut off; and thereafter, the other car nailed in like manner, and cut off, at the expiration of
one other hour: and moreover, to order every such offender thirty-niic lashes, well laid on, on his
or her bare back, at the common whipping-post.

LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MAY 1723 9TH GEORGE 1. 127, http://vagcnweb.org/hening/vol0406.htm#page_126 [https://perma.cc/KKJ9-2PA2]; see also John W. Cairrs, Slavery and the Roman
Low of Evidence in Eighteenth-Centurv Scotland, in MAPPING TIHE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
PETER BIRKS 600-02. 608 (Andrew Burrows & Lord Rodger of Earlsferry ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2006) (indicating Roman law prohibited receipt of testimony from slaves unless obtained by
tortre). Missouri observed the rule that an "interest" witness was disqualified from testifying; a
black litigant was thus disqualified two times over. See, e.g., Hardy v. Matthews, 42 Mo. 406, 410
(1868) ("It is not shown nor is it pretended that she in any wise conducted the business or
transaction about which she was testifying; and this is essential to qualify her as a witness under
the statute."); Riddles v. Aikin, 29 Mo. 453, 454 (1860) (reversing the exclusion of atl uninterested
party's testimony); Page v. Kankey, 6 Mo. 433, 434 (1840) (refusing to let an interested witness
testify on all matters, except one); Graham v. O'Fallon, 4 Mo. 338, 341 (1836) ("[A] devisee, may
or may not be a witness, according as his interest may be balanced, or that his interest may be
against the party for whom ie is brought to testify."). On a related note, a married woman could
only testify if she had personally conducted the business that formed the basis of the dispute.
Ha-dy, 42 Mo. at 410. A white female, even a minor, could testify in a criminal prosecution of a
black man for sexual assault. State v. Anderson, 19 Mo. 241. 245-46 (1853).
8 1. DIGEST, supra note 28. at 34.
82. See Lewis v. lart. 33 Mo. 535, 539-540 (1863) (holding in favor of plaintiff, a free
person of color, who was supported by the testimony of five white witnesses that she was free).
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protection from oppression.
No person could "keep or teach any
school for the instruction of negroes or mulattoes in reading or
writing.

.

.

No assemblage of worship could convene where

"services are performed or conducted by negrocs or mulattoes, unless
some sheriff, constable, marshal, police officer, or justice of the peace,
shall be present during all of the time of such meeting or assemblage, in
order to prevent all seditious speeches, and disorderly and unlawful
conduct of every kind." 8 5 Physical punishment awaited slaves and
persons of color who disregarded these laws. "If any slave or slaves or
any other person or persons of color, shall at any time hereafter, disturb
any religious congregation, which may assemble for public worship, by
making a noise, or other disorderly conduct," the punishment was not to
exceed twenty lashes."
Free blacks could not
[K]eep or carry any gun or weapon of any kind, or any ammunition,
without a license first had and for the purpose, from a justice of peace of
the county in which such negro or mulatto resides, and such license may
be granted and revoked by any justice of the peace of the county.8 7
The same statute provided that, in the absence of the proper license, the
weapon could be confiscated by any person and, if proven before a justice
of the peace to be without proper license, could be surrendered to such
person." Free blacks could not own slaves." Saloons, taverns, and
even grocery stores were forbidden to allow "either slaves, or free persons
of color, to assemble together, . . . at his, her, or their store. . . ."'o

83.

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 222 (2d ed. 1985). Sec

generaliv Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (holding people of African descent held as
slaves are not US citizens and are therefore not entitled to the protections and rights of the
Constitution) (1857).
84. An Act Respecting Slaves, Free Negroes and Mulattoes. Mo. REv. STATS. § I (1847)
85. Id. § 2.
86. Act to Prevent Mischief and Dishonesty Among Slaves and Negroes, and for Other
Purposes, ch. 227, § 4, Mo. LAWS VOL. II (repealed 1969).
87. Act Concerning Free Negroes and Mulattoes, REV. STAT. MO. § 3, 414 (1834-35)
(repealed 1865).
88. Id.
89. Davis v. Evans, 18 Mo. 249, 252 (1853).
90. Act to Prevent Mischief and Dishonesty Among Slaves and Negroes, and for Other
Purposes, ch. 227, § 2, Mo. LAWS VOL. 11 (1839) (repealed 1969).
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These restrictions would have been patently unconstitutional if they
had applied to white citizens. 9 ' But the Dred Scott decision dashed any
hope that black Missourians could find legal protection in the United
States Constitution. 9 2

In 1835, the Missouri Legislature adopted a comprehensive statute
governing slaves and free blacks.9 The new code defined "mulattoes,"
restricted possession of firearms and other weapons, regulated the
apprenticeship of free blacks between the ages of seven and twenty-one,
and expressly discouraged black citizens of other states from settling in
.

Missouri

In 1837, the legislature moved to muzzle abolitionists permanently.
The new Act contained an incremental sentencing scheme that
culminated in life imprisonment for a third violation of anti-abolition
doctrines."*

91. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. 1, 11; Kerri L. Junkele, Segregation in United States
Healthcare: From Reconstruction to Deluxe Jim Crow, 188 IONORS TIESES AND CAPSTONES I

(expounding that restrictions of rights imposed upon African Americans goes against what the
Anglo-American world "considers its hallmark.").
92. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea... compose a portion of
this [sovereign] people and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and
that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the
Constitution, and can, therefore, claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides and secures to citizens of the United States.

Id at 404. Chief Justice Taney explains why Dred Scott lacked legal standing to sue for his own
freedom by stating that black Americans are "so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect," which is eerily reminiscent of Montesquicu's sarcastic explanation of
white superiority. Id.; see COVER, supra note 16, at 14.

93.
94.
95.
Doctrines,

An Act Concerning Free Negroes & Mulattoes, REV. MO. STAT. § 33 (1835).
Id. §§
7.
An Act to Prohibit the Publication. Circulation, or Promulgation of the Abolition
1836 Mo. LAWS § 1, 3.

Ifany person shall publish, circulate, or utter by writing, speaking or printing any facts, arguments,
reasontng, or opinions, tending directly to excite any slave or slaves, or other persons of color, in
this State, to rebellion, sedition, mutiny, insurrection, or murder, with intent to excite such slave or
slaves, or other persons of color, to rebellion, sedition, mutiny, insurrection or murder, such person,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and be
imprisoned in the State penitentiary for a term not exceeding two years and for the second offence,
being thereof convicted, he shall be imprisoned in the State penitentiary for a term not exceeding
twenty years; and for the third offence, being thereof convicted, lie shall be imprisoned in the State
penitentiary during life.

96.

Id.
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In 1838, the legislature adopted a formal resolution that commended
Missouri's Congressional delegation "for their able and manly defense of
the domestic institutions of the Southern and Southwestern States, and
for their uncompromising opposition to the wanton encroachments now
attempting to be made upon them.""
In 1843, the legislature sought to eliminate perceived loopholes in the
earlier statutes by enacting a more comprehensive prohibition against the
ingress of free blacks in the state. 9 8 The statute targeted steamboats, at
that time one of the most important means of public transportation." The
statute stated:
[N]o free negro, mulatto or person of color, shall come into this State, on
board of any steam boat, or other vessel, as a cook, steward, mariner, or in
any employment on board such stream boat or vessel, or as a passenger, or
in any other manner; and if any steam boat, or other vessel shall arrive at
any port, harbor or landing on any river of this State from any other State,

having on board any such free negro, mulatto or person of color, the harbor
master or other officer having charge of such port, or any person or persons
residing at or near said port, or any landing, shall forthwith notify the
nearest judge of any circuit or county court, or justice of the peace in the
county in which said port, harbor or landing is situated, or the arrival of
such steam boats, or other vessel, whereupon the said judge, or justice of
the peace shall immediately issue a warrant to apprehend and bring every
such free negro, mulatto or person of color, before him. and on the
execution of such warrant by bringing before him such free negro, mulatto,
or person of color, he shall forthwith commit him, or her, to the county jail,
there to be confined until said steam boat, or vessel shall be ready to

.

97. Preamble & Resolutions, Respecting Slavery, 1838 Mo. LAws 337.
98. Compare An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color From Entering Into
This State. & for Other Purposes. I843 Mo. LAWS 66 8 ("[N]o free negro. mulatto or person of
color. shall come into this State. on board of any steam boat. or othcr vessel, as a cook. steward.
mariner, or in any employment on board such stream boat or vessel, or as a passenger, or in any
other manner. . .)
with An Act Concerning Free Negroes and Mulattoes. Ri:v. Mo. STAT. § 26,
417 (1835) ("The provisions of this act shall not be construed to extend to any negro or mulatto
employed on board any vessel, or as a wagoncr or messenger. or as the servant of a traveler, while
in the actual employment of a person not a resident of this state.
99. An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color From Entering Into This
State. & for Other Purposes, I843 Mt. LAws § 1, 6667: sc Smithers v. Steamboat War Eale, 29
Mo. 312, 313-4 (Mo. 1860) ("The most common and the most important description of carriers by
water at the present day in this country are the owners and masters of steamboats. which boats are
in almost all cases engaged in the transportation of goods as well as of persons for hire .... ).
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proceed to her place of destination, when the master, or commander of such
steam boat or other vessel shall, by the written permit, or order of said huge
of justice of the peace, take and carry away out of this State every such free
negro, mulatto or person of color, and pay the expenses of his or
apprehension and detention. .oo
Section 2 of the statute required the master of each steamboat to give
a bond of $500 for each person of color on board the vessel.io' Section
3 of the statute required the master of each steamboat to transport out of
the state any free negro, mulatto, or person of color who had been brought
into the state by the vessel. 02 Section 4 of the statute proclaimed:
[E]very free negro, mulatto or person of color, who after having been
transported, or sent out of this State in pursuance of this act, shall return
into the same, shall, on conviction thereof before a court of competent
jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not
less than five years, and if any such free negro, mulatto or person of color
shall be found in this State thirty days after the expiration of said
imprisonment, he shall be indicted therefor, and on conviction, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, for a term not less than ten
years. 103
The statute detailed criminal punishment, including fines and
imprisonment for "any person, who shall introduce, or bring into this
State, any free person of color in violation of this act." o Similarly, "any
person who shall employ, harbor or entertain any free person of color,
shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not less than two
hundred dollars for each offence [sic]." 1 5 Since the Missouri courts
asserted jurisdiction over the entire width of the Mississippi River,"o' a
steamboat could not evade the law simply by traversing the Illinois side
100. An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color From Entering Into This
State, & for Other Purposes, 1843 Mo. LAWS § 1, 66.
101. Id. §2, 66 67.
102. Id 3, 67.
103. Id. §4, 67.
104. Id. § 6, 67. (stating the punishment of the first offense will not exceed $200; the
punishment for the second offence will not exceed six months of imprisonment in county jail and
a fine not to exceed S 1,000).
105, Id. 7, 67.
106. See Swearingen & Couill v. Steamboat Lynx. 13 Mo. 519, 520 (1850) (holding
Missouri and Illinois have concurrent jurisdiction over the part of the Mississippi River running
between the two states).
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of the river. Nor could the vessel owner assert as a defense to prosecution
that the "slave in controversy" was actually free. o7 The only defense
was that the statute did not apply "to any free negro or person of color,
who shall produce a certificate of citizenship of some one of the United
States."' os

In 1855, the Legislature adopted "An Act to expedite the removal of
free Negroes from the State of Missouri,"""o which provided for an
annual appropriation for passage to Liberia of free blacks.' ' In 1856,
the legislature acted again to prohibit the return to Missouri of "any free
negro or mulatto [who] shall go, either on business or pleasure, into any
free State or Territory ....

"'

Although the Missouri Legislature and courts did discuss the
President's first two proclamations pursuant to the Confiscation Act of
1861,112 largely because those proclamations had the effect of nullifying
certain contracts made in the insurgent states,' ' the Missouri courts

107. Calvert v. The Timoleon. 15 Mo. 595, 597 (1852) ("It would seen [sic], that under the
statute, one held in slavery, in violation of law, may assert his right to freedom, in the manner
therein pointed out. But this is a personal privilege, and so long as he acquiesces in his condition,
another cannot litigate his right to freedom.").
108. An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color From Entering Into This
State. & for Other Purposes, 1843 Mo. LAWS § 14. 68.
109. An Act to Expedite the Removal of Free Negroes from the State of Mo.. 1855 LOCAL
LAWS AND PRIVATE ACTS Ot1 MO. § 1-2. 367 (1855).
1 10. The act provided:
Whenever the President and Secretary of the Colonization Society of the State of Missouri shall
certify to the Auditor of Public Accounts that one or more free negroes of this State desire to go to
Liberia. and have made application to be transported, and that the Society is willing to take charge
of the same, the Auditor shall draw his warrant upon the Treasury in favor of the President of said
Society for such sum as would be necessary for the transportation of such applicant or applicants,
allowing sixty dollars for each.

Id
11 1. An Act Concerning Free Negroes and Mulattoes, 1856 Mo. LAWS § 1, 82 (1857).
112. Rep. White, when introducing a resolution for Missouri to not pay interest on any bond
held by northern states during the Civil War. described President Lincoln's actions as such:
The President of the United States has inaugurated a wicked, cruel, and unconstitutional war against
the Confederate States. utnder the pretense of executing the laws and suppressing an insurrection,
when, in truth, we are of the opinion that it is his real intention to array the non-slaveholding States
against the slaveholding States for the purpose of overthrowing the institutions of the South.

Mo. H-lOUSE J., 23rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 27 (1864).
113. See, e.g., Charles v. McCune, 57 Mo. 166, 168 (1874) ("The language of the act is
clear and there is no room for doubt as to its meaning or effect. Commercial intercourse between
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appear to have been silent concerning President Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation. This is likely because Missouri was a "border state" to
which the Emancipation Proclamation was not applicable.' 14
On February 6, 1865, Missouri ratified the Thirteenth Amendment.' '5
Senator Howland transmitted to the Speaker of the House a "concurrent
resolution ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and in which the concurrence of the House is respectfully
requested."' 16 After suspension of the normal ratification rules,
Representative Harlan moved to adjourn; that motion was defeated.' 17
The joint resolution was approved by a vote of 93 to 4, with three
members "absent," twenty-three "absent with leave," and four members
"sick."' 8
V.

CONCLUSION

Before the Civil War, Missouri law tightly regulated the institution of
slavery, which included controlling nominally "free" black citizens.' ')
The legal mechanisms included, inter alia, the presumption of slavery
from the fact of color, 1201 prohibitions against testifying, invoking a right
to habeas corpus,'`' and denying the right of appeal from criminal

the inhabitants of territory in insurrection, and those of telTitory not in insurrection was entirely

prohibited, except under the license of the President, and according to certain regulations.").
114.

The Emancipation Proclamation, NATL

ARCHIVES,

https://www.archives.gov/

exhibits/featured-documents/imancipation-proclamation
[https://perma.cc/7WTN-F9A5]
(last
updated June 26, 2017) (stating the Emancipation Proclamation's expansive language declaring
"all persons held as slaves are, and henceforward shall be free" did not apply to the loyal border
states that had not seceded from the Union).

115. Mo. HOUSE J., 23rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 378-79 (1865).
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id Earlier in 1865, the State of Missouri abolished the practice of slavery by amending
its own Constitution. MO. CONST. of 1865. art. 1, § 2- Mo. IousL J., 23rd Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess., at 147-48 (1865).
119. See An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color from Entering Into This
State, and for Other Purposes, 1842 Mo. LAWS § 1, 66 (1843) (establishing that no free person of
color shall come to Missouri on board a vessel, and if they did same, the master of the ship was to

notify a judge who would then order the persons of color to be detained in the county jail until the
vessel was ready to proceed out of the state).

120.
121.

Charlotte (of Color) v. Chouteau, 21 Mo. 590, 596 97 (1855).
Mo. REV. STATS. CiI. 75 ART. Ill § 8 (1838).
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judgments. 122 Chief Justice Taney infamously summarized the basis for
these legal constructs by proclaiming African Americans were "so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
The Court in Scott held that a slave could not lose his
respect ."'
status simply by temporarily moving to a free state.' Taney reasoned
"in no nation was this opinion more firmly fixed or more uniformly acted
upon than by the English Government."' 2' However, Blackstone, in no
uncertain terms, professed:
And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and
rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands
in England, falls under the protection of the laws; and so far becomes a
freeman.

126

The notion that the United States has two sets of rules-one for African
Americans and one for everyone else-can find support in Scott 's
simultaneous invocation of English common law and willful ignorance

122.

State v. Joe, A Slave. 19 Mo. 223 (1853) (holding slaves accused of petty larceny have

no avenue of appeal).

123.

124.
125.

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Iow.) 393. 407 (1857).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 407 08.

126. 1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONF, COMMENTARIES ON TH: LAws OF ENGLAND 127 (St.
George Tucker ed. 1803). Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court made no effort to explain
why the inconvenient English precedent described by Blackstone and ShtnlCV v. larver, did not
apply to the circumstance in Scott. in which a slave had entered free territory. Compare I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONF, COMMENTARIES ON TIlL LAws oF: ENGLAND 127 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803)
(indicating that slaves become free men once they arrive in England). and Shanley v. Ilarvey (1762)
28 Eng. Rep. 844, 844: 2 Eden 126. 127 (Ch.) (stating "[a]s soon as a man sets foot on English
ground his is free"), with Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Ilow.) 393, 442 (1857) (holding that
precedent shall be "put aside." as it does not apply to the case at bar).
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of Blackstone. 127 The perception that African Americans have no rights
which white people must recognize holds currency when "what we see is
that some lives matter more than others, that some lives matter so much
that they need to be protected at all costs, and that other lives matter less,
or not at all.""'
Recent news events 1 2 1 suggest a "post-racial America" is far in the

127. Exclusion of black residents from housing by virtue of race was consistent with the
public policy of Missouri as late as the end of World War 11. See Kraemer v. Shelley, S.W.2d 679,
682 (1946), 355 Mo. 814, (1946), rev d, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948) (stating "agreements restricting
property from being transferred to or occupied by negroes have been consistently upheld by the
courts of this state as one which the parties have the right to make and which is not contrary to
public policy.").
128. George Yancy & Judith Butler, What's Wrong with 'All Lives Matter'?, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (Jan. 12, 2015), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrongwith-all-lives-matter/?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/TN4U-539T].
129. See, e.g., Lexi Browning & Lindsey Bever, 'Ape in Heels': W. Va. Mayor Resigns
Amid Controversy' Over Racist Comments About Michelle Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/14/ape-in-heels-w-va-officialsunder-fire-after-comments-about-michelle-obama/?utmterm=.f0755802b9e5
[https://pemia.cc/
J2TD-PV9C] (discussing the November 15, 2016 resignation of the mayor of Clary, West Virginia
following from her characterization of former First Lady, Michelle Obama, as "an ape in heels.");
Buchanan, et al., supra note 4 ("The protests against the police have pitted the predominantly black
community against a nearly all-white police force."). The use of dogs and militarized tactics and
equipment by police to control protesters in Ferguson exacerbated already poor to nearly nonexistent race relations during the height of the civil unrest following the death of Michael Brown.
Pete Williams, Justice Department: Police Response Made Ferguson Unrest Worse, NBC NEWS

(Sept. 3, 2015, 7:07 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/justicedepartment-police-response-made-ferguson-unrest-worse-n42 1116
[https://perma.cc/GF8DKH9B]. Following the unrest, the Department of Justice released a scathing report of the Ferguson
municipal court and city entities, triggering sweeping changes and reforms to both the court system
and law enforcement. Laura Wagner, Ferguson Approves Police and Courts Overhaul-WithSome

Changes, NPR: TIHlE TWO-WAY (Feb. 9, 2016, 11:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/02/09/466221524/ferguson-approves-police-and-courts-overhaul-with-some-changes
(emphasizing in part on training law enforcement in Ferguson to de-escalate opposed to using
force); Tef Poe, Ten Disturbing/v Racist Things About St. Louis, RIVER FRONT TIMES (Dec. 5,

2013, 10:33 AM), https://www.riverfrointtimcs.com/musicblog/2013/12/05/ten-disturbingly-racistthings-about-st-louis [https://perma.cc/3UFV-LLT7] (describing, anecdotally, how certain areas,
customs, and colloquial phrases used in St. Louis have a racist past, connotation, or effect on the
people of the city).
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future. 130 Perceptions of black citizens as "superhuman" 131 or even
"demonic" persist as an excuse for the use of deadly force. 132 What is

130.

See Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial

Epoch, 34 ST. LoUIs U. L.J. 393. 402 (1990) (outlining the past acquiescence of white Americans
in enacting policies that subordinate rights of black Americans in furtherance of other interests).
Many examples of America's racial tensions can be found in jury arguments. See Calloway v.
Fogel, 213 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Mo. 1948) (finding prejudicial error in defense counsel's argument
that he represented not only defendant's, but also "this community[,] . . the Kansas City way of
life[,] . . . the way we live and the way we expect others to live."). The Supreme Court explained
that "[w]hile counsel disclaimed, elsewhere in argument, any intention to invoke 'the racial angle'.
the implication in the argument . . is, we think, unmistakable." Id at 410. The Court related "[t]he
red hot iron of prejudice has been thrust into the case: merely withdrawing it still leaves a festering
wound" when discussing the harmful effects of counsel's argument. I. at 409 (quoting O'l lara v.
Lamb Const. Co., 197 S.W. 163, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917)). Compare State v. Jackson, 83 S.W.
2d 87, 94 -5 (Mo. 1935) (reversing conviction due to prosecutor's argument that "[a] black man
[was] assaulting a white woman in a vacant house at an early hour in the morning."), and State v.
Cook, 112 S.W. 710, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (finding reversible error in the prosecutor's argument
that the cause of white mobs in the community was the direct result of a white jury "backing tip a
burly negro" in certain offenses, including those involving firearms). with State v. Brown, 636
S.W.2d 929. 937 (Mo. 1982) (finding there was no "racial innuendo designed to affect the jury's
deliberations" in prosecutor's closing argument: "Well, ladies and gentlemen, you're the only ones
that can do anything. You're the only ones that can do anything in this case. The Judge can judge,
the Reporter can report. I can prosecute, the Police Officers can police. We can all do it 'til we're
h/ack in the face.") (emphasis added), and State v. Mitchell, 620 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. 1981)
(finding no reversible error from prosecutor stating "[Defendant] told you he, you know, is not like
us. And he's not, he rapes and robs and burgles and threatens old ladies with baseball bats" despite
the fact that prosecutor and jury were all white and defendant was black), and State v. Noel. 693
S.W.2d 317, 318 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding prosecutor's proffered statistic that 90 percent
of all murders are "black on black" was not an appeal to the racial prejudice of a white jury), nd
State v. Stamps, 569 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
It is an all white jury. The witnesses have all been white. For the most part there have only bcen
white people in the courtroom all week. There may have been one black boy who has been in one
short moment watching. [Defendant] is black. Now, that might strike fear into your beart or any
black defendant who faces twelve white jurors. But I feel confident in this country that twelve white
jurors are going to sit in judgment on a black man no differently than they would on a white man. I
feel confident. I don't have any concerns along that line. The one concern I might have is that alt
all white jury in this pariticular county might be unfair to the State in their attempt to be more fair to
a black than they might be to a white. They might attempt to be extra fair. There is no requirement
to do that. [Defendant] is not entitled to any different trial than a white man, red, oriental or any
other color.
Id. at 767 (finding no prejudice, and therefore no reversible error, in prosecutor's argument).
131. See Transcript of Grand Jury at 198. 212, State of Mo. v. Darren Wilson (2014),
[https://perma.cc/
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 1371222-wilson-testimony.html
4WSC-H2FJ] (detailing how Officer Wilson described himself as six feet, four inches tall, about
210 pounds, yet he "felt like a five-year-old holding onto lulk I logan" during his encounter with
Michael Brown). Further, Officer Wilson described his fear that after receiving two punches from
Brown, "the third one could [have been] fatal if he hit me right." I.
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the honest answer when a high school student asks "How can you tell us
we can be anything if they treat us like we're nothing?"' 3 3
One salient example of this perception is racial profiling by police
officers. Racial profiling also runs contrary to another conservative tenet:
Everyone must follow the rules.
"We say that students have to live by and be governed by a set of rules
because as citizens in society we live by rules. Order and security depend
on a community's commitment to abide by these rules. But these teachings
are undermined whenever police stop and search innocent children.
Teenagers have a general sense of how the police are supposed to treat
them. While only some can name the specific constitutional command (the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures), all are aware that the government does not have the unlettered
[sic] right to search you when you have done nothing wrong.

. .

. Yet police

misconduct teaches them that the government violates these rules every
day and that they have no recourse. If their government does not follow
the rules, reason the students, why should they'?"' 3 4

It is well-documented that the very perception of race tends to
"[A] novel implication of the
dehumanize black citizens.' 3 5
dehumanizing representations of Blacks presented in this paper is that
Black boys can be misperceived as older than they actually are and
prematurely perceived as responsible for their actions during a
developmental period where their peers receive the beneficial assumption
Goff, et a., suggest that while middle-class
of childlike innocence."'
white males in their late twenties are not held fully responsible for their
actions, "present research suggests that Black children may be viewed as
adults as soon as 13[,] with average age overestimations of Black children

132. See id. (describing Brown as having "the most intense aggressive face[,]" and that
Officer Wilson could only describe this face as "look[ing] like a demon").
Conservatives Shouhl
I33. James Forman, Jr., Children, Cops, and Citi:enship: Whi
Oppose Racial Profiling, in INVIIist

IMPRISONMENT

150.

159

PUNISI IMENT: Till COLLATERAL CONSI;QUENCFS OF MASS

(Marc

Mauer

&

Meda

Chesney-Lind

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4605&context=fs

134.

eds.,

2002),

papers.

Id. at 155 56.

E.g., Philip Atiba Goff. et al. The IYsence of Inno1cence: Consequences of
Dehwnanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. Psyci 1. 526. 526 (2014).
136. Id. at 540.
135.
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exceeding four and a half years in some cases...."137 Why is this
misperception of age important?
Relative to peers sent to juvenile facilities, children who are sentenced as
adults are twice as likely to be assaulted by a correctional officer, five times
as likely to be sexually assaulted, and eight times as likely to commit
suicide. These outcomes are particularly worrisome for Black children,
who are 18 times more likely than White children to be sentenced as adults,
and who represent 58% of children sentenced to adult facilities. 138

The "New Jim Crow" is a far cry from the old Jim Crow, 1" but the
137. Sce, c._ id at 541 (suggesting that dehumnanization is a dangerous intergroup frame
of mind and that intergroup acumen of children is a field lacking adequate research).
138. Id at 526.
139. The brutality of the old Jim Crow included
[P]ublic torture lIchings [sic]. in which a whitC man could, while on his lunch break. see a black
man lynched, buy a postcard with a photo of the dangling body. and send it via regular U.S. mail to
a friend with this note: 'Well John - This is a tokett of a great day we htad in Dallas. March 3rd
[I 910]. a negro was hung for an assault on a three-year-old [sic] girl. I saw this on mV noon hour.
I was very Much in the bunch. You can see the Negro hanging on a telephone pole.
Forman, Jr., supra note 5. at 141. Justice Murphy penned the following dissent. objecting to the
reversal and remand for retrial of the conviction of three Georgia law etiforcement officers for
depriving Robert I lall of a constitutional right to due process by way of beating him so severely as
to cause his death, who was in their custody following arrest for allegedly stealing a tire:
Robert Hall, a Negro citizen. has been deprived not only of the right to be tried by a court rather
than by ordeal. He has been deprived of the right of life itself. That right belonged to him not
because lie was a Negro or a mnember of any particular race or creed .... That right was his because
he was an American citizen, because lie was a huiman being. As such. ie was entitled to all the
respect and fair treatment that befits tle dignity of nan, a dignity that is recognized and guaranteed
by the ('istitition. Yet twot evein the setnblance of due process has been accorded him. He has
beei cruelly atdtilunjustifiably beaten to dcath by local plice otfficers acting under coor of autlhority
derived from the state.
Screws v. United States, 32-5 U.S. 91. 134 35 (1945) (1Murphy, J., dissenting). But see, c.g., NLRB
v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co.. 337 U.S. 656, 660 n.4 (1949) (illustrating how ship owners had sought to
undermine unions by distributiig "copies of a union pamphlet entitled 'NMU fimghts Jim Crow.'
which the utiion wished to withhold fromn circulation for fear the unlicensed seamen would react
unfavorably to a union advocating racial equality."): Town of Visalia v. Falkenheiner, 123 L.a. 625,
626 (1909) (requiring a tavern serving both black and white patrons to purchase two liquor licenses
because of Louisiana's law oti segregated facilitics); Durkee v. Murphy, 29 A.2d 253. 265 (Md.
1942) ("Separation of the races is normal treatment in this State." (quoti ,ig Williams v.
Zimmerman, 172 Md. 563, 567, 192 A. 353. 355 (Md.App. 1937))). Coomare I louck v. Southern
Pac. Ry. Co., 38 F. 226, 229 30 (W.D.'Tex 1888) (sustaining a pulitive daiage verdict of S2,000
against a railroad whose brakeman forcibly attempted to keep the plaintiff, a black passenger, in
the "Jim Crow car" because the evidence justified the jury inl coicIuiding that the "separate" car for
black passengers was tiot "equal" to the white car for which the railroad had sold the first-class
ticket) with Stratford v. Midland Valley R. Co.. 128 P. 98. 100 (1912) (imposing a duty, through
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attitudes underpinning the systematic repression of the latter persist. 140
Those attitudes appear to be deeply rooted in the antebellum slave system.
Understanding the antebellum slavery system is one step toward
changing those attitudes, and perhaps toward the obliteration of the
persistent societal memory of an odious system.

the Jim Crow Act, on conductors to remove any passenger not entitled to ride in the designated car
and immunizing railroad against any damages the passenger might sustain from being removed)
and Carrey v. Spencer. 36 N.Y.S. 886, 888 (1895) (awarding immunity to interstate trips through
the Tennessee statute knows as the "Jim Crow car"). The National Parks Service has compiled a
See general/v Jim Crow Laws, NAT'L PARK SERV.
summary of Jim Crow laws.
[https://permacc/W6F6-KR7D]
https://www.nps.gov/imaluleam/cducation/jimcrowlaws.htim
(last updated Apr. 14. 2015).
140. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein, The Presence of the Post: Confronting the Nazi State and
Jim Crow, HUMAN IN ACTION, http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/332-the[https://perma.cc/F3BE-NBRN]
presence-of-the-past-confronting-the-nazi-state-and-j i-crow
(last visited Oct. 26, 2017) ("In 2011, one hundred and fifty years after secession and the start of
the Civil War, many Southern states celebrated the date with balls and festivities."); Josh Clinton
& Carrie Roush, Poll: Persistent Portisan Divide Ovcr Birther' Question, NBC NEws
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.comi/politics/2016-electioni/poll-persistent-partisan-divideover-birther-question-n627446 [https://perma.cc/E6YJ-EVRU] ("Only slightly more than one in
four Republican voters agreed that the president was born in the United States."); Michael D. Shear,
Colin Powell, in lacked Emails, Shows Scorn for Trump anI lIrritation at Clinton, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/us/politics/colin-powell-emails-hackdonald-trump.htmi [https://nyti.msi/2koVcqll] (reporting former Secretary of State, Colin Powell,
enailed "the whole birther movement was racist."); Tishaura Jones Stains Post Editorial Board
While Declining Interview, St. Louis Am. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local
niews/tishauriia-jonies-slami-s-post-editorial-board-while-declining-initeriew/ar-ticle bf690c28-cce9Ile6-a351-lf4dd2a2e28d.htrnl [https://perma.cc/7N9T-CFK9] ("What is killing our region is a
systemic racism that pervades almost every public and private institution, including your
newspaper, and makes it nearly impossible for either North St. Louis or the parts of South St. Louis
where African Americans live to get better or safer or healthier or better-educated.").
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